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Abstract 
Purpose: To present an approach to determine the price companies should bid to win 
a contract to deliver product service systems, and make a profit. 
Design/methodology/approach: Industrial case studies are used as the test bed. 
Combinations of subjective probability and value modelling have been used in this 
research.  
Findings:  Current approaches to determine the price to win for a product oriented 
service contract have mainly focussed on the cost of the physical asset and its’ 
specification.  There is little research, where the ‘value’ of the tangible and intangible 
aspects of a product service system to the customer is considered.  The proposed 
approach provides the decision-maker with information on the value of their/and their 
competitors offering, assisting in selecting the price to bid for the service contract.   
Practical implications: Our approach can be used by industry to model the key value 
drivers for their customers and provide information on the probability of winning and 
probability of making a profit.  This research provides a step-by-step approach for 
identifying uncertainties eliciting the value of the service being offered to the 
customer and modelling these to estimate the probability of winning.  
Social implications: This research provides practical guidance to decision makers and 
bid teams. 
Originality/value: Highlights how the tangible and intangible aspects of a Product 
Service System can be quantified in monetary terms to assist in decision-making. 
Keywords: Product Service Systems, Price to Win, Value Modelling, Subjective 
Probability, expert elicitation 
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1. Introduction 
In some high-value manufacturing sectors complex assets, such as planes, trains and 
ships are no longer being sold as ‘assets’, but are offering through-life support – i.e. 
advanced services. These advanced services are often referred to as Product Service 
System (Meier et al, 2010; Baines & Lightfoot, 2013 and Tukker, 2014).  
 
Examples of such advanced services include the AUD$640 million contract awarded to 
Cobham to deliver airborne search and rescue capability from 2016 (Cobham, 2014) 
and the Bombardier £1.3 billion deal with Transport for London to provide new trains, 
depot and maintenance for the London CrossRail project (Bombardier, 2014).  
 
Currently industry/governments are sourcing their service requirements in a number 
of ways.  Figure 1 depicts example scenarios for an aircraft. Here the outer ends 
illustrate where the customers either, owns the aircraft and undertakes all the support 
themselves, or on the far rights where the customer pays for the full service of having 
the mission performed.  For the research presented in this paper our focus is on 
advanced services, where the customer is paying for a ‘service’ ranging from 
maintenance contracts through to full mission support. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Service contracts investigated in this research 
Contracts being placed for an agreed outcome are not new.  In the late 1980’s the 
roads in Sub Saharan Africa were maintained using Performance-based Management 
and Maintenance of Roads (PBMMR).    The overriding aims of these contracts were to 
reduce costs and increase quality (Zietlow, 2011).   Although roads may be seen as 
simple assets, the PBMMR moved from providing cost plus (i.e. the cost of the activity 
plus an agreed profit) for roads to the providers being paid for the ‘quality’ of the road 
‘in-use’, often referred to as ‘value-in-use’ (Ng et al, 2010). 
 
However, the move towards such contracts has resulted in the provider absorbing 
more of the risk, especially when compared with the previous cost plus contracts 
(Zietlow, 2011; Selviaridis & Norrman, 2014). This increases the uncertainty for the 
provider of the advanced service.    The exposure that companies face in the transition 
from being a manufacturer to providing an advanced service is illustrated through 
reduced profit margins.  In the PBMMR, one provider in Sub-Saharan Africa found their 
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profits reduced by 50% (Patel, 2011).  This reduced profit is often termed the “service 
paradox” (Gebauer et al, 2005).   One approach to managing the ‘service paradox’ is to 
model uncertainties within the bid cycle.  In such cases the bidding company needs to 
estimate their cost for delivering such services as well as determining an appropriate 
price bid.  The price bid will be affected by affordability challenges of the customer 
(Bankole et al, 2012) as well as factors such as the cost to the company and what 
competitors may bid.   Newnes and Goh (2013) describe a structured approach for 
‘Managing Uncertainty in Contract Bidding’, which models the tangible monetary 
factors and provides the probability of winning the contract and making a profit, as 
well as the expected profit value. 
 
The advantages of ascertaining the probability of winning the contract and making a 
profit can be used throughout the bid cycle.  Industry feedback has described the 
benefits of using the outputs for bid/no-bid decisions as well as determining the 
amount of effort and bid team to be used within the process.  However, the overall 
output from an advanced service is the ‘value’ of the offering, which includes both 
tangible and intangible attributes.  The inclusion of intangible attributes in the bidding 
process is becoming more explicit in both European Law as well as from the 
perspective of the customer and the provider of the service, especially when the 
provider is bidding for Government contracts.  
2. Assessing tangible monetary factors in the UK Government Procurement 
To be awarded a manufacturing and/ or servicing contract in the UK public sector; 
companies compete via a formalised open bidding process subject to UK and/or 
European law (OJEU, 2014). Interested, qualified and viable organisations that meet 
pre-qualification criteria are asked to submit a proposal in response to a detailed 
specification from the government (usually drawn up in partnership with deputised 
services with specialised and technical knowledge) (GOV.UK, 2013).   
 
The contract award process can often go through a number of iterations and 
negotiation phases that enable both parties to discuss and agree on detail. Once 
finalised, responses are treated as an offer to complete the specified work for an 
agreed amount of money (GOV.UK, 2013). These documents are often lengthy 
technical tomes describing exactly what will be delivered and how it meets specified 
criteria. After contract award they become part of a legally binding Service Framework 
Agreement consisting of a series of complex contract schedules (Procurements 
Lawyers Association, 2012). Awarded contracts can be worth vast sums of money and 
it is vital that the process is both transparent and robust. A recent example is 
Bombardier who won a £1 billion contract to provide 65 trains for the London Crossrail 
project which is set to open in 2018 (Moylan, 2014; Bombardier Media, 2014; TFL, 
2014).  
 
The UK government each year on goods and services spends around £187 billion with 
third parties; around half of this is estimated to be to be on contracted out services 
(Public Accounts Committee, 2014).  Implicit in each contract awarding decision is the 
Government’s responsibility and accountability for ensuring value for money on behalf 
of the taxpayer. This value for money can include engagement with SMEs, social 
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aspects of the contract such as regeneration and job creation.  Evidence that has 
emerged in recent years suggests that the government does not always achieve the 
best for citizens on this account. Examples include both G4S and Serco who were 
found to have overcharged the Government in their electronic tagging contracts 
(Travis, 2014).  The poor performance of G4S in supplying sufficient numbers of 
security guards for the 2012 London Olympics (Booth and Hopkins, 2012), Capita's 
failure to deliver court translation services (BBC, 2014), issues identified by a 
Department of Work and Pensions UKs audit into Atos's work capability assessments 
leading to removal of the contract (Independent, 2014), and misreporting of out of 
hours GP services by Serco (Farrell, 2013). 
 
This suggest a serious weakness in the Government’s ability to identify appropriately 
qualified suppliers as well as negotiate and manage private commercial contracts on 
behalf of the taxpayer. It also suggests that there are flaws in the adequacy of the 
contracting process per se, in that these contracts do not appear to have been 
awarded on the basis of a company’s ability to complete the contracted work 
effectively or competently. 
  
Both customers and potential suppliers try to understand the how to assess the factors 
that should have an influence on the contract award decisions. Research at the 
University of Bath (Newnes and Goh, 2013) demonstrates a quantitative analysis 
process for contract bidding that models the influencing variables and depicts their 
impact as a decision matrix in terms of the probability of; winning the contract, making 
a profit and the expected profit for a number of bid prices. However, it is recognised 
that decisions based purely on monetary analysis present limitations such as; noisy 
data misleading analysis; the quality and relevance of the data is not guaranteed 
(Gough, 2007); many business decisions require the analysis of independent variables 
whose non-linear relationships are challenging to create accurate algorithms for and 
ascertaining the value of the contract includes tangible and intangible attributes 
(Parry, 2013).  Kapletia et al (2009), demonstrate that, intangible factors rather than 
just cost can be significant in contractor selection. 
 
In our current research we have created a structured approach to manage uncertainty 
in contract bidding (Newnes and Goh, 2013).  However, the initial research focussed on 
estimating price to win based on the tangible attributes (manly technical performance 
measures and cost) for analysing the proposed bid and taking account of the 
uncertainties.  The output is a decision matrix, which shows the probability of winning 
the contract and the probability of making a profit.   This approach was adopted to 
ascertain industry feedback to our modelling methods and to engage with 
stakeholders.  The findings from our stakeholder engagement reflect the views 
discussed earlier in this paper, in that modelling the value of the offering is essential 
when modelling the price to win/value for money of a contract. Section 3, describes 
our current research and what was required to model the ‘value’ of an offering. 
 
3. Background research – Probability of Winning and Probability of making a profit 
In the initial research we created a framework for identifying the uncertainties when 
bidding for an advanced service contract.  Four top-level influencing factors were 
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identified as having an influence on a companies bidding strategy (Kreye et al, 2014). 
These are the internal company processes, the contract conditions for the service 
provision, the customer whom the service is being delivered to and the competitors 
who will be competing in the bidding process.  These influencing factors encompass 
requirements such as offset arrangements, affordability of the service for the 
customer i.e. their budget limitations, stakeholders (direct and indirect), quality of 
service and payment terms.  Figure 2 depicts the framework with the four categories 
of influencing factors.  These factors were created from the literature and through 
multiple stakeholder engagement workshops.  The workshops included input from 
customers, bidders and stakeholders.  The additional factors identified by the 
industrial experts included e.g. offset arrangements (Matthews, 2014) which have an 
influence on the bid strategy, payment terms, partnerships and trust in the bidding 
company/reputation.  The framework provides an overview of the main influencing 
factors.  To enable the effective use of the framework we utilized a five-step process. 
This process guides the user to first identify the relevant uncertainty factors, collect 
the information on each of the identified uncertainties, process the collected 
information and then model the uncertainties.  Finally a decision matrix is created to 
assist the decision-maker in determining the price to bid.  Figure 3 shows this five-step 
process and Table 1 shows an example decision matrix for use by the bid team.  A full 
description of this research can be found in Kreye et al (2014) and Newnes and Goh 
(2013).   
However, although this research provided input to the bidding process, through our 
engagement with industry and government feedback from stakeholders demonstrated 
that it was essential to consider more than the monetary aspects of the bid.  In 
particular, industry was keen to model the value of the proposed offering to the 
customer and determine what the customer would be willing to pay for an advanced 
service.   
This maps closely with the findings from the literature and government procurement 
described in Section 2.  As highlighted the UK Government is not perceived as sourcing 
value for money in public sector contracting.  
 
To estimate the value of a proposed solution to a customer intangible attributes as 
well as intangible attributes need to be modelled and their value determined.  The 
method we have used to define the value model and an example of such a value 
modelling process is described in the remainder of this paper. 
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Figure 2: Framework – Managing Uncertainty in Contract Bidding 
 
 
Figure 3: Five-Step Process 
 
Decision 
Matrix 
                                
Price bid  5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 
Probability 
of 
winning % 
upper 100 98 97 93 88 79 71 62 51 38 24 15 8 4 0 
 lower 100 98 97 93 87 77 67 56 45 33 21 12 6 3 0 
Probability 
of making a 
profit % 
 0 3 13 28 50 86 94 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Expected 
Profit 
£M -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
 
Table 1 – Example Decision Matrix 
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Requirement Essential  Desirable Aspiriational 
A 
Maintain loiter position 
within 2km under wind 
speed 
30kts 40kts 50kts 
B Operational Limits Up to 66deg N/S any time of year 
Beyond 66deg N/S 
during winter for 0 
- 5 weeks 
Beyond 66deg N/S 
during winter for 
>5 weeks 
C Time to achieve new loiter position < 12 hours < 9 hours < 6 hours 
D Power / Propulsion 2 kW 10 kW 50 kW 
E Endurance Requirements Months Year Years 
F Recycling 
Minimum 90% 
recyclable on 
disposal 
Minimum 95% 
recyclable on 
disposal 
100% recyclable on 
disposal 
G Payload Requirements 200kg 500kg 1000kg 
H Loss rate 1e-5 / flying hour 1e-6 / flying hour 1e-7 / flying hour 
I Mission failure rates < 1 in 5 < 1 in 10 < 1 in 25 
J Maintenance Intervals > 5000 flying hours (6 months) 
> 10000 flying 
hours (1 year) 
> 20000 flying 
hours (2 years) 
 
4. Proposed Value Model for the Probability of Winning and making a profit. 
To create a value model which assessed industries value of a particular offering we 
needed to identify what the customer would be willing to pay for the offering, 
estimate the value of any competitor offerings to the customer as well as estimate the 
cost of our offering.   To create our modelling and evaluate the results from the model 
we used an example of an Unmanned Air Vehicle. 
 
4.1 Unmanned Air Vehicle Exemplar  
The exemplar used to undertake the value modelling is the PERsistent Green Air 
Vehicle (PERGAVE), which is an unmanned air vehicle.  PERGAVE is an exemplar 
concept of operations that BAE Systems Military Air Information uses to engage with 
academic partners. 
 
Table 2 lists ten requirements that the PERGAVE solution is required to meet in order 
to be a compliant bid to the customer, bids that are not complaint will be rejected.   
These are tangible requirements that the customer will use to evaluate the bid i.e. the 
physical attributes of the ‘product’ as part of the product service system.  “Essential” 
offers the lowest acceptable level of capability that PERGAVE must meet for a 
compliant bid to the customer.  “Aspirational” offers the maximum level of capability.  
During a bid, the provider needs to determine what level of requirements they will 
offer to the customer.  This will depend on the affordability of the solutions to the 
customer as well as whether the provider has the capability to deliver such a system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – PERGAVE Performance Requirements 
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4.2 Value model creation  
For the value model we account for tangible and intangible attributes.  Table 2, depicts 
the physical attributes required for the PERGAVE offering.  A provider may select to 
offer a solution which meets the ‘Essential’ requirements the customer has requested.  
If one focuses on estimating the price to win using the tangible items where the 
customer believes what is offered will be delivered the approach described in section 2 
provides a structured approach estimate the price to win. 
However, in reality customers evaluate a bid based on the technical attributes as well 
as whether they believe the provider is capable of delivering the offering they are 
proposing i.e. the customers’ perception of the offering.  If a company offered a 
solution where they stated that the PERGAVE would only require servicing every two 
years, the provider may wish to assess whether the customer would believe that such 
an aspirational target was achievable.  In this research we are proposing the use of 
value modelling.  Here, attributes such as whether the customer believes you would 
deliver such a maintenance interval are also considered alongside the tangible 
attributes.  Figure 4 illustrates our value modelling approach.  The customers’ 
perception of the offering is elicited, the cost for the bidding company to deliver the 
offering is estimated and a price is selected based on the level of profit required and 
the offering from the competitors in terms of price and value.  
 
Figure 4 – Value Modelling Top-Level Inputs 
To develop the value modelling and estimate the probability of winning the contract 
and making a profit as per the initial research we have utilised a structured approach 
consisting of five key steps. The five steps consist of building the Value Model, 
identifying the uncertainties regarding the customers’ perception of your offering, 
quantifying your own price bid and any competitor price bids, estimating the value to 
the customer of our bid and the competitor bids and finally using a decision matrix to 
evaluate various scenarios in terms of our proposed/expected price bid. 
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4.2.1 Step 1 - Value model creation  
The first step of the model is to build the value model that maps the customer’s 
“willingness to pay” as a function of important attributes of any proposed offerings.  
These attributes may include sustainability, system response time, availability and 
other attributes. This step attempts to quantify the experts’ uncertainty in what the 
customer would be willing to pay for a particular solution proposed.  
Depending on the number of attributes to be considered, eliciting the experts opinions 
could become problematic, especially if there are too many questions they need to 
answer.  Hence, the selected attribute set should be minimised in order to reduce the 
elicitation efforts.  In previous research we have utilised Taguchi orthogonal arrays to 
elicit information from experts within the cost estimating domain (Saravi et al, 2013). 
Based on the use of this approach in other costing domains and as it is a robust 
process to follow a Taguchi orthogonal array was chosen as the Design of Experiment, 
to minimise the number of elicitation questions the experts need to answer. Naturally, 
if it is appropriate and timely the experts can answer a full set of questions with no 
rationalisation. 
For the PERGAVE example Power, Payload and Maintenance Intervals were selected as 
the ‘hot’ buttons for the customer.  Within Taguchi this would require an L9 
experimental array for 3 attributes at 3 levels is shown in Table 3. The solution space 
explored in this example is Power (2, 10, 50) kW; Payload (200, 500, 1000) kg and 
Maintenance Interval (5000, 10000, 20000) hours. These represent the three levels of 
requirements the customer requested i.e. essential, desirable and aspirational. 
 
   Value (£M) 
Ex
p 
Power 
(kW) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Maintenance 
Interval (hrs) Min 
Most 
Likely Max 
1 2 200 5000 6 8 10 
2 2 500 10000 10 12 14 
3 2 1000 20000 13 15 17 
4 10 200 10000 11 13 15 
5 10 500 20000 12.5 14.5 16.5 
6 10 1000 5000 11 13 15 
7 50 200 20000 13 15 17 
8 50 500 5000 11.5 13.5 15.5 
9 50 1000 10000 13.5 15.5 17.5 
 
 Table 3 – PERGAVE Performance Requirements 
The experts are asked to provide their opinion of the value a solution with certain 
attributes, e.g. in Experiment 1 (Power = 2 kW, Payload = 200 kg and Maintenance 
Interval = 5000hrs), is worth to the customer including the uncertainties in the values 
given as Minimum, Most Likely and Maximum values. 
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Based on this information, value models can be built to map the relationships between 
customer’s value (or willingness to pay) for a given set of attribute values. Figure 5 
illustrates a value model in 3-dimensional space, where A1 and A2 are attributes. This 
model allows us to explore our uncertainty about the customer’s value for any 
proposed solution within the solution space. Hence, for any solutions with given 
attribute set (A1, A2, A3,…., An) we can derive the minimum, most likely and maximum 
values as shown in the figure.  
 
Figure 5 – Mapping the value to the customer of attribute combinations 
4.2.2 Step 2 – Customers perception of the offering  
This step addresses the uncertainty in a customers’ belief of the offerings proposed by 
bidders. In other words, the customer may not believe that the provider would be able 
to deliver the exact offering specified. This step quantifies any intangible risk factors 
that are assigned against individual bids, such as their trust in the contractor’s 
capability, past experiences etc.  
Therefore for any offerings to be proposed to the customer, experts will be asked to 
quantify what they believe the customer’s perception would be for the offering 
proposed to them. This step is undertaken for the bidding companies bid as well as any 
competitors whose bids are to be evaluated when estimating the probability of 
winning.   The PDFs depicted in Figure 6 illustrate how uncertainties in attributes A1 
and A2 of the proposed solution may be expanded to include uncertainties.  
A1
A2
Va
lu
e
Min        ML       Max
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Figure 6 – Uncertainties in proposed attributes and customers perception of what will be 
delivered 
In our example, we evaluate how our own proposed offering compared against a single 
competitors offering, where the uncertainties in the attributes are summarised in 
Table 4. 
 Own proposed solution Competitor’s proposed 
solution 
 Min ML Max Min ML Max 
Power (kW) 8 10 11 8 10 11 
Payload (kg) 800 900 1000 800 900 1000 
Maintenance 
Interval 
(hours) 
4500 5000 5500 5000 6000 7000 
 
Table 4 – Uncertainties in the attributes for bidding company and competitor solutions 
If one examines the proposed solution in isolation, the competitors’ offering would be 
deemed as superior as the mean maintenance interval is longer whereas the other 
attributes are the same. This assumes the customer trusts both bidders equally. 
However, the probability of winning depends on the respective price bids and the 
customers’ perception of the offering.  
 
4.2.3 Step 3 – Quantification of the price Bids  
This step involves quantification of the price bids for our own and that of competitor’s. 
For our own price bid, this is a decision variable and a range of values can be evaluated 
to enhance our probability of winning.  For the competitor’s price bid, we need to rely 
on the experts’ opinion to establish a baseline. This quantification may also include 
experts’ uncertainties in their belief. If more than one expert is consulted, their beliefs 
need to be combined into a single PDF and can be weighted accordingly (Newnes et al, 
2013). Furthermore, if we assume that our competition is rational, they would select 
the price/design that maximizes their value. This scenario has not been included here 
but is subject of future work. 
4.2.4 Step 4 – Establish expected values for our own and any competitor offerings  
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This step establishes the expected value for our own and the competitor’s offerings. 
Monte Carlo simulations can be performed to propagate the uncertainties in attributes 
through value models.  
 
4.2.5 Step 5 – Probability of Winning the Contract  
For various price bids, we need to establish the probability of acceptance to the 
customer. The rationale is that the bid will be acceptable to the customer, if and only if 
it’s value exceeds the price bid. The uncertainty in the customer’s value model and 
their perceived attribute values result in a probability of acceptance. The same 
rationale applies to any other competitor’s bid, except that there might be 
uncertainties in our estimate of the competitor’s price bids.  
Once the acceptance to the customer is established, four scenarios can be expected.  
• Both our own and the competitor’s bids are not acceptable, i.e. all bidders do 
not offer a surplus in value against their own price bids (price > value), the bids 
will all be rejected. Here the customer may choose to rebaseline, and revise 
their work specifications. 
• In the second scenario, both our own and the competitor’s bids are acceptable 
to the customer. In other words, they both offer a surplus in value (value > 
price). In this situation, the customer will be looking to offer the contract to the 
contractor with the higher surplus.  This assumes the customer is rational and 
their decision making is to maximise their surplus. 
• In the third scenario, only our bid is acceptable. Then the customer will offer 
the contract to us. 
• In the fourth scenario, only the competitor's bid is acceptable. Then the 
contract is lost to the competitor.  
Based on the above, the probability of winning can be established. As our proposed 
solution is inferior to the competitor’s, it can be seen that at a lower price (£8.5M vs 
£9M) we have a 87% probability of winning the contract but only 35% probability of 
winning if both bidders offer at £9M.  Table 6 shows an example decision matrix with 
the price points occurring in £0.5M increments. The probability of making a profit and 
expected profit are taken from Table 1.   
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Price bid (£M)  5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.5 12 
Probability of making a 
profit % 
 0 3 13 28 50 86 94 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Expected Profit (if 
contract is won) 
  -2 -1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
Probability of winning % 
(FROM VALUE MODEL) 
Competitor's 
Price = £9M 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 87 35 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Competitor's 
Price = £8M 
100 100 100 100 100 86 21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 6 Final decision matrix 
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5. Conclusion and Future Research 
Our research has shown that to meet the needs of the stakeholders within an 
advanced service delivery system the value of the system encompasses tangible and 
intangible attributes.   
The background to our modelling to estimate the probability of winning a contract and 
he probability of making a profit has been presented.  Through industrial workshops, 
meeting with government contractors and the analysis of recently funded bids we 
have shown that modelling tangible attributes has advantages at the early bidding 
stage (section 3).  However, when bidding for advanced service contracts the feedback 
from industry and findings from the literature conclude that a value model is required.  
This value model should include the ability to estimate the ‘value’ of intangible 
attributes and account for the customers’ belief on whether the provider is capable of 
delivering the proposed service for the price being offered. 
We have proposed a value model where we utilise Taguchi design of experiments to 
identify the offerings to be ‘valued’.  The expected value of the offerings is then 
gathered through by eliciting the value from subject matter experts.  These experts 
also provide a view on whether the customer believes the offering will be delivered as 
stated, which reflects the customers value of the actual offering they believe they will 
receive. 
In the value modelling analysis we assume that the customer is rational.  A decision 
matrix is created and scenarios based on the probability of winning for a particular 
price bid are undertaken.  The rules used in the analysis are: 
• Customers are rational 
• If the bid price is greater than the value of the offering the bid is not acceptable 
to the customer and the bid will be rejected. 
• If the price is less than the value of the offering the bid is acceptable to the 
customer and the bid would be accepted. 
• When comparing whether the bidding company will win the bid we assume the 
bid must be acceptable and affordable to the customer, and the bidding 
company which has the largest positive difference between price and value will 
win. 
The value model described in this paper has been assessed and verified by our industry 
partners and we are now undertaking live case study trials to validate our approach. 
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